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 REALITY AND PRACTICALITY: CHALLENGES 
TO EFFECTIVE CULTURAL PROPERTY POLICY 
ON THE GROUND IN LATIN AMERICA 
 Donna  Yates * 
  
 Abstract:  Although on-the-ground preservation and policing is a major 
component of our international efforts to prevent the looting and trafficking 
of antiquities, the expectation placed on source countries may be beyond their 
capacity. This dependence on developing world infrastructure and policing may 
challenge our ability to effectively regulate this illicit trade. Using case studies 
generated from fieldwork in Belize and Bolivia, this paper discusses a number 
of these challenges to effective policy and offers some suggestions for future 
regulatory development. 
 It is exceedingly difficult to develop high-level policy that reflects the diversity of 
situations in both antiquities source and market countries. There exits an inherent 
challenge between the globalized and the localized; between high-level regulatory 
schemes that must apply to all and the needs and capabilities of the locations 
in which it is applied. Assumptions that must be made about developing states’ 
internal capabilities during the crafting of high-level policy may not produce action-
able interventions on the ground. As a result, there are aspects of our international 
antiquities policy regime that are consistently challenged by the realities of pro-
tection and law enforcement in parts of the developing world. Yet, as it stands, 
antiquities source countries are considered to be our first line of defense against 
theft and trafficking. In many sensitive developing world situations, our existing 
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international system of cultural property regulation does little to protect heritage 
sites  in situ or to break up the criminal trafficking networks. If we are to continue 
to consider source-end protection as a lynchpin of the global combating of the 
illicit antiquities trade, we need to address these issues directly. We also must 
consider a greater shift in focus from source-end protection to real and effective 
market reduction. 
 In this article I will discuss the on-the-ground experience of cultural property 
protection in two developing Latin American countries with rich archaeological 
heritage consisting in part of antiquities and other cultural objects with market 
appeal: Bolivia and Belize. Although drastically different in size, both countries 
face similar internal pressures related to violence, insecurity, the continued effect 
of narcotics production and trafficking economies, and the need to improve the 
lives of a largely poor citizenry. Both countries have a strong interest in protecting their 
cultural heritage from an economic standpoint in the form of cultural tourism 
but also as a component of the maintenance of national identity. 
 Based on information gathered from interviews conducted with heritage profes-
sionals and interested stakeholders during targeted fieldwork in Belize (2014) and 
Bolivia (2013), I will provide a sketch of the various challenges to the effective protec-
tion of heritage and prevention of antiquities trafficking in each context. Using these 
examples as case studies, I will discuss three points of perceived disconnect between 
the realities of cultural property protection in certain developing world contexts and 
the aspirational international system that these practitioners are working within: 
1. the burden placed on local law enforcement for site protection and criminal 
investigation vs. the realities of underfunding, institutional failure, remoteness of sites, 
and access to training and technology; 2. a regulatory system that focuses on devel-
opment and maintenance of international partnerships even when such partner-
ships neither reflect the geographical orientation of the illicit trade, nor the realities 
of geopolitical schisms; 3. the tendency for regulatory development at all levels to 
focus on cultural property trafficking in isolation rather than as part of a web of 
interrelated illicit economies that might be best regulated or policed together. 
 I close with policy suggestions which may help to address the realities of antiquities 
trafficking and heritage protection in many parts of the developing world. 
 The goal of this paper is not to critique the construction or the intent of specific 
regulatory tools, but rather to discuss how certain aspects of our existing system of 
international antiquities regulation play out on the ground and how they are per-
ceived and experienced by those on the front line in two developing world contexts. 
 BOLIVIA  1  
 Background 
 Bolivia is a landlocked South American state that straddles the high Andean plateau 
and the western Amazon. About 63 percent of its population of 10.5 million people 












































live in urban areas and the rest are spread out over Bolivia’s vast rural and often 
poorly accessible tracts. Bolivia has a remarkably low population density, esti-
mated at about 9.46 people per square kilometer.  2  Ethnicity is a decisive political 
and social issue and is a major component of Bolivian identity. The country has 
a large Indigenous population, with estimates ranging from about 40 percent to 
over 60 percent of the population, depending on how the question is asked, and 
the majority of Bolivians who do not identify as Indigenous, identify as Mestizo 
(as do many people who identify as Indigenous).  3  Although White Bolivians com-
prise a small minority of the population, political power was historically concen-
trated in this group; Bolivia has been considered one of the most racially stratified 
countries in the Americas. 
 This began to change in the 1990s when modifications to the law allowed for more 
Indigenous participation in public life.  4  In late 2005, after a period of popular protest 
and the resignation of two presidents, Evo Morales became the country’s 99th presi-
dent, the first to self-identify as Indigenous. His leftist government, which remains 
in power at the time of writing, has instituted significant changes within nearly all 
sectors of Bolivian governance, culminating in the passing, in 2009, of an entirely 
new constitution which refounded the Republic Bolivia as the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia.  5  Long-considered to be the poorest country in South America, since Morales’ 
election Bolivia has tripled per capita income in the country and its real GDP growth 
has been projected at 6.7 percent, the highest it has been in 30 years.  6  This, coupled 
with aggressive wealth distribution policies from the Morales government, has led to 
small but noticeable poverty reduction successes in the country, although Morales’ 
regime is not without considerable external and internal criticism. 
 The protection of the remains of Bolivia’s spectacular ancient and Colonial past 
is set against this backdrop. Bolivia was the heartland of the Tiwanaku culture, a 
major player during the Andean Middle Horizon, and the eponymous archaeolog-
ical zone is both a UNESCO World Heritage site and a core component of national 
identity. The material remains of this culture, as well as those of the subsequent 
Inka and Aymara cultures, have historically been in demand on the international 
antiquities market (although less so than objects from neighboring Peru). Bolivia 
is also home to numerous Colonial-era churches, many located in very remote 
or even abandoned villages. These churches often contain art objects: paintings, 
icons, and silver, the latter being the result of the massive silver mines at Potosí. 
In recent decades, international demand for sacred Colonial Andean art has grown. 
 Since 1906 it has been illegal to excavate Bolivian archaeological objects without 
a government license and illegal to remove them from the country.  7  Objects of 
Colonial and Republican art were subsequently added to this ban and, as it stands, 
it is illegal to buy, sell, and export these objects in all circumstances. All of these 
objects, be they undiscovered in the ground or hanging in a Colonial church, 
are considered cultural property of the Bolivian state. Thus, almost every ancient 
or Colonial Bolivian cultural object on the international art market left Bolivia in 
violation of the law.  8  
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 Record Keeping 
 Looking specifically at the maintenance of records concerning aspects of cultural 
property we can see how quickly such action as a mandate can fail in the developing 
world. In Bolivia, all known cultural property of the nation has required govern-
ment registration since 1961.  9  This is a two pronged process: individuals or groups 
who possess cultural objects that fall under the law are required to notify the 
Ministry of Cultures so that the objects may be registered and the Ministry of 
Cultures is meant to maintain an office tasked with seeking out registerable objects, 
for example in remote historic churches. Furthermore all dealers in antiquities are 
meant to be formally registered with the government and their premises are meant 
to be regularly inspected.  10  All of this fits well into the framework set out by the 
1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970 UNESCO 
Convention)  11  (indeed, many of these laws are post-UNESCO), and were certainly 
an aspect of Bolivia successfully obtaining a bilateral agreement concerning cultural 
property import restrictions with the United States.  12  
 Yet while this registry system exists on paper, the system is aspirational: it rep-
resents a mandate that an under-funded ministerial department in a poor country 
is unable to meet. Few people voluntarily register cultural property in their pos-
session, a complete dealer list has not been compiled in years, and archaeological 
store rooms, even at major sites, have not been inventoried.  13  An exception is the 
register of cultural property within museums and churches. The files concerning 
objects in these known heritage structures are extensive which has helped in the 
recovery of stolen objects in a number of cases.  14  That said, as is often the case, 
the success of this registry appears to be associated with the devotion and the con-
tinued institutional presence over several decades (remarkable in Bolivia) of an 
individual who has dedicated himself to this particular task. As of mid-2013, these 
commendable records only existed on paper and the dedicated individual hoped 
that they would be digitized someday but was not expecting funding anytime soon. 
In other words, while these records exist, police, customs agents, and others cannot 
easily access them. 
 Policing and Institutions 
 In Bolivia police protection and state-level justice remains unavailable to most cit-
izens. In 2012, nearly half of Bolivia’s municipalities did not have a judge, 77 percent 
did not have a prosecutor, and 97 percent did not have a public defender.  15  Bolivian 
confidence in the police is one of the lowest in Latin America: only 38.9 percent 
express confidence in their police force, on par with Mexico (39.9 percent), a coun-
try whose police force has one of the worst reputations in the world. Furthermore, 
44.8 percent of Bolivians reported that they felt insecure: on par with famously-
insecure Haiti at 44.2 percent.  16  












































 This feeling of general insecurity in Bolivia results in conflict between commu-
nities and the state-level police and justice systems. To use one extreme example, 
there exists in Bolivia a concept called  Justicia Comunitaria (Community Justice), 
which is informally defined as a pre-Conquest Indigenous system of values, judg-
ment, and consequence that exists alongside the regular state-level justice system. 
A version of  Justicia Comunitaria was enshrined in the 2009 constitution as the right 
for communities to police themselves according to their own Indigenous belief 
system. However , Justicia Comunitaria in Bolivia (especially when that particular 
term is used) is nearly always linked to fatal or near fatal lynching of accused crim-
inals.  17  These lynchings usually happen in poor communities where petty theft has 
a devastating effect and where the police are seen as either not present or as crim-
inals themselves. Incidentally, these poor communities, especially rural ones, are 
also the primary targets for cultural property theft. The majority of recent thefts of 
Conquest and Colonial artworks from Bolivian churches, some 34 thefts from 2008 
to 2012, have occurred in small, poor, rural, Indigenous villages that are, by many 
accounts, outside of the reach of the state-level authorities.  18  Many recent accounts 
of cultural property thefts in these areas include complaints from villagers that it 
took multiple days for the government to send anyone to investigate the crimes, 
and lamentations from cultural property investigators that the villages in question 
are very difficult for them to access. 
 Recently a limited number of communities have been turning to  Justicia Comu-
nitaria to deal with cultural property theft, sometimes with fatal consequences. 
In early March 2012, two men were lynched in the village of Quila Quila after they 
were allegedly caught robbing Colonial-era paintings from the local church. They 
were collectively ‘tried’, beaten, strangled, and buried behind the church they were 
said to have robbed. What followed was a multi-day standoff between the com-
munity and the police, leading to an assurance that the community would face no 
charges if they handed over the alleged thieves’ bodies.  19  Bolivian communities 
believe that their authorities are not competent and are entirely unable to protect 
their heritage sites. 
 Crime reporting 
 Although the looting and trafficking of antiquities is considered a distinct crime 
under Bolivian law, and a form of aggravated theft under the penal code,  20  Bolivia 
has neither a cultural property/heritage police task force, nor a dedicated point 
person that coordinates cultural property theft and looting cases between the var-
ious government and security agencies that have a stake in the matter. The recent 
introduction of new heritage law in the country focused more on archaeology and 
contained no new provisions for crime prevention and policing. 
 As it stands in Bolivia, when there is a reported case of cultural property theft 
(usually from a historic church), a warning is issued to Interpol and to Bolivian 
customs from the relevant body within the Bolivian Ministry of Cultures. This notice 












































usually contains details of the theft as well as photos and descriptions of the items 
that were stolen. That such photos are available is a testament to the dedication 
of Bolivia’s cultural heritage documentation group: most countries are unable to 
issue such reports. That said, it is unclear to what degree customs agents are made 
aware of these reports. As of the time of writing there is no database of stolen cul-
tural property that is available to anyone outside of the Ministry of Cultures. When 
archaeological objects are stolen from the ground, or evidence of looting at an archae-
ological site is detected, no warning is issued. It is unclear if any central records 
of incidents of archaeological looting are kept. Archaeologists are often unaware of 
the scale, scope, and focus of cultural property crime within the country. 
 As is the case in many developing countries, smuggling is part of Bolivian reality, 
a fact rarely discussed during international debate over cultural property regulation. 
A sizable amount of the goods available on the Bolivian market have been smug-
gled or are illicit to some degree. In recent years anti-corruption measures have 
been put in place and border agents are better monitored for corruption. However, 
fake electronics, copied software and DVDs, photocopied books, and any number 
of other items for which duty has not been paid make their way to Bolivian con-
sumers. La Paz, for example, has a massive maze-like market district referred to 
as  El Mercado Negro (The Black Market), which is indicated on quite a few maps. 
Every consumer good imaginable is available in the stalls of this part of the city. 
In the past, it has been reported that some illicit antiquities have been bought and 
sold there.  21  
 Due to financial constraints, it is unlikely that any of this will change any time 
soon. Because the idea of a certain interpretation of ancient Bolivia has become the 
core of a Bolivian identity and is supported by the current government, completely 
reinventing the regulation of Bolivian cultural property seems unlikely. Yet it is 
possible that, internally, the illicit trafficking of Bolivian cultural objects can be 
policed alongside other illicit goods. Indeed, this is the situation that already exists, 
but formalization of the linkage may prove effective. 
 International relations and antiquities 
 Since early 2006 when leftist Evo Morales became president of the country, rela-
tions between Bolivia and some antiquities market nations, notably the U.S., have 
been strained. This has had a direct effect on Bolivia’s ability to recover stolen 
cultural objects. For example, in August of 2013, I was informed that a number of 
looted Bolivian church items had been found for sale on the internet via U.S.-based 
dealers. Having checked my own records, I can document the items were available 
online from at least early December 2012. The thefts of these items occurred in the 
late 1990s and it is unclear when and how they were imported into the U.S. This, 
however, was not of specific concern: the objects had all been photographed and 
documented by Bolivia’s Ministry of Cultures and Bolivia could clearly prove that 
these objects were stolen; return should have been straightforward. 












































 Yet, U.S. and Bolivian sources stated that extremely poor relations between the 
countries had caused complete stagnation. Although everyone involved (except, 
perhaps, the antiquities dealer) knew where these stolen objects where and agreed 
that they should be seized and returned, the final paperwork needed to put this 
operation in motion was not able to go through. Both the Bolivians and Ameri-
cans working on this case had deep respect for their counterparts but felt that they 
were in a political bind. They were unable to advance bilateral cooperation with a 
country that their government does not wish to cooperate with. All involved care 
passionately about Bolivian cultural property and are doing good work under the 
circumstances, but the circumstances are not good. As of June 2015, over two years 
later, at least some of these stolen cultural items were still available online.  22  
 Theft of cultural property has a profound destabilizing effect on Bolivian 
communities. Perhaps no case demonstrates that better than that of the famous 
Coroma textiles, the theft of which inspired the first UNESCO convention-based 
restrictions on the import of Bolivian cultural objects into the U.S.  23  This bilateral 
agreement, sought by the Indigenous community members of Coroma who per-
sonally petitioned the U.S. government for intervention, has been hailed as a 
triumph. The textiles were returned, there were convictions in three countries, and 
a community’s sacred heritage was restored. Yet, despite this bilateral success, the 
heritage of Coroma is not truly protected by the U.S./Bolivia agreement: the cul-
tural objects mentioned in the previous paragraph, still for sale on the internet and 
the subject of official stagnation, were stolen from Coroma’s conquest-era church 
in the late 1990s.  24  Coroma’s church was also looted in 2008 and in 2009.  25  
 BELIZE  26  
 Background 
 Belize is a small Central American state on the eastern side of the Yucatan Peninsula. 
Formerly British Honduras until independence in 1981, the country is sparsely 
populated: 361,000 people in about 23,000 square kilometers for a population 
density of about 15.7 people per square kilometer.  27  Despite its small population, 
Belize is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, with most Belizeans 
considering themselves to be multiracial. About 34 percent of the population is of 
mixed Maya and European descent, 25 percent are Kriol, meaning mixed African and 
(largely) British descent, and both of those groups are racially mixed with other 
Latin Americans, West Indians, Afro-Amerindians (Garifuna), and increasingly 
Chinese, East Indians, and low German-speaking Mennonites. Most Belizeans are 
multi-lingual, speaking English as well as Kriol and, more often than not, Spanish 
and one or more Maya languages. 
 Belize’s archaeological past is spectacular. It houses numerous major and 
minor Maya archaeological sites, from small sacred caves to large metropolises. 
Belizeans encounter archaeological objects and sites in their day-to-day lives and 












































archaeological themes appear on everything from the currency and on Belize’s 
most popular brand of beer. The sites are spread throughout the country, but there 
are major concentrations of sites along Belize’s borders with Guatemala and Mexico, 
making cross-border trafficking a serious concern. 
 Tourism is a large component of Belize’s economy. As the country is located 
only a short flight from the U.S., is English-speaking, has a currency that is pegged 
2:1 to the U.S. dollar, and is filled with exotic natural and archaeological sites, it 
has positioned itself as an easy adventure holiday for U.S. travelers. Because of this, 
threats to nature and to archaeology are considered to be threats to the country’s 
economy. Belize was heavily hit by the various waves of archaeological looting in 
Central America, particularly for carved stone stela in the 1960s, and elaborately 
painted polychrome pottery up into recent years. The most comprehensive study 
of looting in Belize was conducted in the early 1980s  28  and the most recent study 
was undertaken in 1999.  29  
 Record Keeping 
 Looking at record keeping in Belize, which too is mandated by law,  30  we can observe 
the typical developing world situation where a well-trained, credentialed, and 
devoted but very small archaeological body is stretched too thin to do everything 
that they would like to. The individual in charge of their library of records plans on 
digitizing them with the strong hope of making them publically available for free 
online. However, as of 2014 they lacked the appropriate scanning equipment and, 
more importantly, lacked the staff needed to accomplish the task. They stated that 
they would have to do the work themselves, but did not have the time. Interviews 
with other government-employed professionals indicated that in presentations 
and internal documents, they were still using various looting, trafficking, arrest, 
and seizure numbers from as far back as the early 1980s  31  and that the last time 
such numbers were rounded up was 1999.  32  Such records have not been specifically 
kept for no other reason than a lack of staff and a lack of time. That said, Belize has 
made a big push to try to get citizens to voluntarily register archaeological objects 
in their possession as mandated by law.  33  
 Policing and Institutions 
 In 1934, Aldous Huxley wrote, “If the world had any ends [Belize] would certainly 
be one of them. It is not on the way from anywhere to anywhere else. It has no 
strategic value. It is all but uninhabited....”  34  Although harsh, this quote sums up 
the logistical issues of policing in Belize. Its vast, jungle-covered territory contains 
very few people, is difficult to monitor making it a haven for illicit activities. About 
33 percent of Belize’s population is considered to be below the poverty line and 
the country has an unemployment rate of 23 percent. Gang violence is on the rise 
in the country, particularly in Belize City. In recent years Belize has had one of 












































the highest murder rates in the world, from 6th to 3rd highest, close in ranking to 
neighbors such as Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.  35  Rape, violent crime, 
and burglary rates are also extremely high in Belize. The population has historically 
held the police in low regard due to increasing violence and a perceived failure of 
the police to respond to and investigate crimes.  36  
 Very few crime or justice studies have focused on Belize and academic evalua-
tion of policing in the country is limited. An exception is a pilot study conducted 
by Hanson et al. in 2004. At the time they found the Belize Police had a staffing 
shortfall of 13.4 percent as well as a budgetary shortfall. The police lacked basic 
resources: police station parking lots resembled salvage yards, vehicles were scarce 
and barely operational, and the Maritime Unit of this long-coasted Caribbean 
country had only one functioning boat. Poor infrastructure is an issue: a critical 
lack of roads (as well as the poor condition of existing roads) and some of the most 
expensive public utilities in the region discourage various types of monitoring and 
policing, as well as development. 
 Belize shares long jungle borders with both Mexico and Guatemala. Because 
of the density and remoteness of the jungle as well as Belize’s small population 
and small police and defense forces, these borders are relatively open. Interviews 
with Belize police indicate that police checkpoints are easily avoided “by simply 
walking through trails in the jungle.”  37  This, coupled with its position between 
South America and the U.S., has increasingly led Belize to become a strategic point 
in the international trafficking of all sorts of illicit goods, including narcotics and 
persons. Reports indicate that many of the criminals operating on Belize’s borders 
are former Central American paramilitaries, hired into the cartel support infrastruc-
ture and that they are “commonly found better armed than the police.”  38  
 All existing studies on the looting and trafficking of cultural property in Belize  39  
and my own fieldwork, document a clear trans-border element to this type of 
crime, both historically and into the present day. Large Maya sculptural pieces such 
as Stela 2 from Machaquilá were looted from Guatemala, carried across the Belize 
border, and exported to the U.S., in that case via a boat to Florida.  40  Ethnographic 
work has shown that looting gangs from both Guatemala  41  and Mexico,  42  them-
selves from the peripheries of the periphery in their own countries, have been able 
to move freely between countries. Belizean looters, too, certainly have operated on 
whatever side of the border was most advantageous. Especially when it comes to 
transnational crime, this criminal activity occurs in Belize precisely because it is so 
difficult to monitor the country’s remote borders. 
 Nested Illicit Economies 
 Central America has changed a lot in recent decades. Shifts in the regional localities 
of the transnational trade in narcotics have inspired a movement southward into 
areas along Mexico’s borders with Guatemala and Belize and down into El Salvador 
and Honduras.  43  The specifics of these regional shifts are outside of the scope of 












































this paper,  44  but in Belize this has led to a situation where the idea of an antiquities-
specific focus of either organized or disorganized crime is highly unlikely. Cultural 
property trafficking is neither profitable enough, nor can it be used to effectively 
“clean” or launder narcotics money. The cartels have more profitable activities to 
engage in. 
 At this time antiquities looting and trafficking in Belize appears to rests within a 
regionalized collection of illicit economies.  45  Although antiquities looting special-
ists may have existed in the past,  46  looting and trafficking in the present is far more 
opportunistic. Individuals or groups are willing to commit a number of different 
illicit activities (e.g. animal poaching, smuggling consumer goods across the bor-
der, land encroachment, illegal logging, laundering money for narcotics cartels, etc.) 
because they see them as viable alternatives to other activities and their environment 
supports such crimes. In other words people commit certain low-cost crimes if the 
opportunity to do so arises, especially when the physical and moral consequences 
of committing such crimes are minor and the crimes, themselves, are perceived as 
victimless. 
 An interesting example of this can be seen within the Mennonite communities 
along Belize’s border with Mexico. Ideologically opposed to outside governance, 
Belize’s Mennonites have historically been implicated, often unfairly, in the nar-
cotics trade,  47  trans-border smuggling of a number of goods, illegal demolition of 
archaeological sites, and the looting and trafficking of antiquities: both in the form 
of actual looting/transport and in receiving money from looting groups for access 
to sites on Mennonite land.  48  Clearly only a limited number Belize’s Mennonites 
are willing to engage in these illicit economies; however, some do see it as a viable 
alternative to other activities, see little consequence in their behavior, and live in 
an environment that both encourages financial gain and discourages compliance 
with external government. 
 Another example are the so-called “subsistence diggers,” recorded in Paredes 
Maury’s work in Guatemala and Matsuda’s work in Belize.  49  While Matsuda’s 
“subsistence diggers” do seem to be primarily focused on archaeological looting, 
he does connect their activity directly to illegal migration into Belize (and thus a 
lack of legal work option) as well as illicit overland transport of other goods. Pare-
des Maury’s ethnographic work focused on looting conducted by poor chicle gum 
collectors in rural Guatemala who would loot archaeological sites to add to their 
meager income, mostly because they were moving through the deep jungle any-
way. Looting was the focus of her work, but she notes that people in the region also 
supplement their income by poaching endangered animals, participating in illegal 
logging, and participate in the narcotics trade. 
 Discussion of antiquities looting as one of many opportunistic illicit activities 
is common in Central America. A group of Guatemalan archaeological workers 
I spoke with in 2003 stated that they had looted sites in the past and that they 
poached a jaguar for its pelt because the opportunity to do so was there. As I spoke 
to a former looter in Belize 2014, we drove a woman to a certain spot near the 












































border so she could carry undeclared meat to her shop in Mexico, a service for 
which the driver was paid. Former Belizean forestry workers that I interviewed did 
not see much difference between people they caught looting and, say, people they 
caught trapping macaws, indicating that these were sometimes the same people. 
 Thinking Internationally in the Past and Present 
 Many of the problems associated with regulating the illicit trade in Maya antiq-
uities via international partnership agreements stem from the fact that modern 
borders do not follow ancient borders. Although the various ancient Maya polities 
each had their own distinctive iconographic styles, even those styles cross mod-
ern borders. Maya polities also participated in complex trade with each other: just 
because an artifact is of one style does not mean it was not traded to another region 
in antiquity. Even when a Maya objects bears the name of a known site (the Maya 
were, of course, a literate culture), this does not conclusively indicate a modern 
country of origin as it is clear that such objects were traded over great distances.  50  
It is almost impossible to conclusively determine which modern country a previously-
unknown looted and trafficked Maya artifact came from. 
 Until the 1970s, looting at Maya sites was focused on stone stela and carved 
architectural elements (lintels, staircases, etc.), massive pieces that were often cut, 
thinned, or otherwise mutilated for transport. In 1969, Clemency Coggins published 
a short article which shone a light on the dark trade in looted stela and inspired 
public discussion about the pillage of Maya sites. In 1972, as a result of the profes-
sional outcry that followed and an acknowledgment that the U.S. was the primary 
market for looted Maya objects, the U.S. passed Public Law No. 92-587 9 U.S.C. 
§ 2091: “Regulation of Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural 
Sculpture or Murals.” It states:
 No pre-Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture or mural which 
is exported (whether or not such exportation is to the United States) from 
the country of origin after the effective date of the regulation [...] may be 
imported into the United States unless the government of the country of 
origin of such sculpture or mural issues a certificate [...] which certifies that 
such exportation was not in violation of the laws of that country’. Any piece 
of pre-Columbian monumental sculpture must have ‘satisfactory evidence 
that such sculpture...was exported from the country of origin on or before the 
effective date of the regulation. 
 In other words, unless a valid export permit could be produced, all pre-Columbian 
murals, sculptures, or architectural pieces were prohibited from entering the U.S. 
 It is important to note that this law is object-focused not country-focused. 
A Maya stela stopped at a U.S. border cannot enter the country without a valid 
export permit and thus “fresh,” unprovenanced stela cannot enter the country at 
all. It does not matter what Central American country that stela came from and 
it does not matter if the exact country of origin is unknown at the time the stela is 
detected. The U.S. does not need to determine where it is stolen from to establish 












































that a stela is contraband, if it does not have the appropriate paperwork, it cannot 
enter the country. This law shares some characteristics with the contemporaneous 
1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES),  51  which, among other things, creates an outright ban on the 
movement of certain plant and animal species no matter where they came from or 
where they were seized. The result of this law was the collapse of the U.S. market 
for Maya stela and architectural pieces.  52  No one could argue that a “new” stela 
that appeared on the market without an export permit was legal and no Central 
American country would ever issue an export permit for an artifact on anything 
other than a temporary basis. 
 An unforeseen consequence of the ban on sculpture and architecture was a shift 
in market demand. After 1972, the U.S. market for Maya stela largely disappeared, 
but the market for Maya pottery exploded, seemingly because it was not covered 
by the 1972 law.  53  It would seem that the appropriate response to this increase in 
trafficking of looted Maya pottery should have resulted in an object-specific U.S. 
restriction on the importation of Maya pottery, perhaps in the form of a permit 
requirement, however that did not happen. 
 In 1983 the U.S. implemented the 1970 UNESCO Convention via the Conven-
tion on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CCPIA). CCPIA gave the president 
of the U.S. the ability to impose import restrictions on certain cultural objects fol-
lowing a request from another state that is party to the UNESCO Convention and 
to negotiate and enter into bilateral agreements to this effect. These restrictions are 
bilateral and country specific. Instead of, say, mandating valid export permits for 
all Maya pottery no matter the country of origin, the U.S. restricts the import of all 
Maya pottery from a particular country with which it has an agreement. The prob-
lem with this should be clear: looted Maya objects that, inherently, do not have a 
known modern country of origin can fall through the cracks.  54  
 At the time of writing, the U.S. has cultural property agreements in place with 
all of the Maya countries, although the treaty with Mexico is slightly different and 
was developed before the U.S. implemented the 1970 UNESCO Convention.  55  The 
U.S. and Belize only entered into a cultural property bilateral agreement in 2013, 
meaning that in the years since the implementation of the UNESCO Convention 
there was at least one Maya heartland country with no U.S. import restrictions. 
This allowed for exploitable ambiguity in the import and sale of Maya objects in 
the U.S.  56  
 The destruction to Maya sites associated with the looting of pottery and other 
small items not covered by the U.S. law of 1972 has devastated the region. Although 
the looting of stela was destructive, these sculptures are usually stand-alone pieces. 
Pottery and other smaller items are normally found within caches and tombs located 
deep within Maya temples and other structures. The trickle-down effect of the 
switch in market demand towards these smaller objects was the wholesale destruc-
tion of thousands of Maya buildings. Almost every known Maya site has been com-
promised by this wave of looting. 













































 1.  Burden on Developing Countries’ Institutions 
 As it stands, most of the financial burden of the on-the-ground policing of the illicit 
traffic in cultural property rests on the source country in the form of physical pro-
tection of archaeological and cultural sites. The existing system places emphasis on 
stemming the supply of looted antiquities at the source rather than discouraging 
demand. To a large degree, our current regulatory regime depends on extensive, 
competent, and well-funded internal protection over market-end disruption. This 
is reflected in the wording of Articles 5 and 6 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 
mandating that the states party to the convention set up national services with 
“qualified staff sufficient in number” to carry out documentation, protection, excava-
tion, education, regulation, certification, customs, and policing duties within their 
territories. While subsequent articles of the 1970 UNESCO Convention call for 
international collaboration, the internal duty to fund protection operations 
within source countries is emphasized. Even if this wording is merely an ideal, 
it evidences a clear focus on disruption at the source and not disruption of either 
transnational trade or the market. Yet as we have seen with both Bolivia and Belize, 
such source-end disruption may lay far outside of the logistical and financial capacities 
of developing countries. 
 Most major antiquities source countries, such as Belize and Bolivia, are located 
in the developing world where resources are limited. Although these countries 
often enact tough anti-trafficking laws with stiff penalties, as is the case with both 
Bolivia and Belize, when faced with the logistical and financial difficulties inherent 
in the developing world, such laws prove nearly impossible to enforce. Internal 
legal mandates to train, maintain, and heavily fund numerous different policing, 
documentation, and heritage preservation groups in an effort to fend off the inevi-
table effects of international demand for illicit antiquities are left underfunded in 
the face of more pressing problems. Such mandates are seen as insurmountable 
obstacles to both engaging in international discussions concerning antiquities traf-
ficking regulation and to successfully negotiating cultural property agreements. 
 Furthermore, institutional failures in security-related sectors in the developing 
world are an impediment to the ideal functioning of existing international traf-
ficking prevention measures. High-level international policy formation tends to 
assume, at least on paper, that there will be a competent police force on the ground, 
an adequate customs service to combat smuggling, and a functioning justice system 
to punish wrongdoers. Yet in many developing countries, such functional and 
funded institutions are the exception, not the rule. 
 As can be seen in Bolivia, despite steady improvement in recent years, a sizable 
portion of the population is unable to access state-level institutions. Police are seen 
as corrupt and insecurity is the norm. In Belize, police suffer from inadequate equip-
ment, short staffing, and remote jungle covered borders. Although the law is clear 












































and antiquities theft and trafficking penalties are steep in both countries, few 
criminals are ever apprehended. Those that are may languish in judicial limbo for 
years or be let go simply because these justice systems are working with numbers 
far above their capacity. Again a key element in our international system for antiq-
uities trafficking prevention, security on the ground, depends on the financial and 
organizational stability of countries that are rarely financially and organizationally 
stable. 
 Bolivia and Belize, like most developing countries face major threats related to 
internal and international crime. Their ability to deal with those issues is seriously 
hampered by corruption, inaccessible territory, and limited financial resources. Yet 
there is a perceived expectation internationally that local police and related institu-
tions should be a key component of our international efforts to regulate the flow of 
looted antiquities onto the market. This expectation may prevent the apprehension 
and prosecution of individuals higher up on the antiquities trafficking chain and 
puts an unfair burden on the victims of antiquities theft. Leaving these and other 
policing and protection efforts up to source countries does not adequately protect 
heritage sites, does not adequately protect communities, does not prevent illicit antiq-
uities from entering the market, and does not disrupt the illicit trafficking chain. 
 2.  Focus on Countries, Not Objects 
 The development of international agreements between states, either within the 
framework of the 1970 UNESCO Convention or outside of it, is at the core of our 
existing international regulatory regime to combat antiquities trafficking. There 
are a number of issues that arise when regulation of the illicit antiquities trade is 
reduced to relations between only two modern states. The most obvious is that the 
paths that looted cultural objects pass through on their way to the market often 
include third (or fourth or fifth) states which may or may not have cultural prop-
erty agreements or favorable relations with the initial source and ultimate market 
countries. They may have no vested interest in spending scarce policing funds on 
what they might consider to be someone else’s problem. 
 Yet there are more subtle issues on the ground with heritage site protection based 
on international agreements. Even when agreement is in place, poor relations between 
the two countries will stall recovery efforts. This is put in particularly sharp focus when 
considering the return of cultural property from the U.S. to Bolivia. Although relations 
between these two countries are unsteady, some sort of continued relationship and 
ongoing negotiations are required for stolen Bolivian cultural objects either to be pre-
vented from entering the U.S. or to be returned. Thus international relations become 
the focus, not the objects themselves, and preservation hinges on these relations. This 
country-specific approach is quite different from an object-specific approach, which 
would require various proofs of ownership and permits for antiquities to cross borders 
or enter the market. In other words an object-specific approach requires less negotia-
tion and can continue to function even when international relations sour. 












































 Furthermore, a country-specific focus can be completely ineffective when dealing with 
ancient cultures that spanned across several modern states. In the case of many forms 
of Maya pottery, it is nearly impossible to determine which Central American country 
a looted piece came from. When such pottery is seized outside of Central America, 
it is usually unclear which modern state can or should claim it. Even when a Maya pot is 
intercepted leaving Belize, the origin of the piece is not immediately obvious as it could 
have passed in that country from either Mexico or Guatemala. This ambiguity can and 
has been exploited by traffickers. However an object-specific regulatory approach, per-
haps modeled after CITES and requiring permits and ownership documentation for 
all Maya pottery crossing any border, might serve to better control the market for such 
pieces. Maya pottery without a clear country of origin and a clean export history would 
be prevented from entering the market country and the market itself. 
 3.  Cultural Objects in Isolation 
 We tend to think of cultural objects as unique. They are the manifestation of the 
intangibilities of human identity, and it is easy to see why there is an urge to produce 
legislation that distinguishes cultural property theft from other crimes. While it may 
be correct to separate the theft and trafficking of such rare goods as antiquities from 
the mundane “normal” stolen goods, that does not mean that antiquities trafficking 
is unrelated to other crimes. The trafficking and illicit sale of antiquities may be one 
of a series of interrelated criminal activities which include the transport and sale of 
other objects. Likewise, the looting of archaeological sites may be a response to eco-
nomic instability caused by unrelated crime, such as the encroachment of displaced 
persons onto protected land due to the activities of drug cartel support economies. 
 This certainly seems to be an issue in Central America, where antiquities looting 
appears to be one of a number of illicit border economies that individuals engage in 
either when opportunity presents itself or out of need. These illicit activities are often 
conducted by the same people in the same space. Using the example of Belize, desig-
nated archaeological sites are often in protected forest zones. These protected zones are 
also the site of illegal logging and rare wood taking, illicit palm cutting for the inter-
national flower market, poaching of jaguars for pelts, taking of rare parrots, protected 
orchid theft and smuggling, and illegal farmsteading, as well as stopover points for 
planes involved in narcotics trafficking. To an extent, many of these crimes are policed 
together on the ground by forestry workers and tourism police, but administratively 
they are differentiated from antiquities trafficking and exist in a separate place within 
national law and our international regulatory regime. A reduction in illegal farming 
activities might reduce archaeological site looting; a crackdown on, specifically, parrot 
smuggling might result in individuals turning to artifact smuggling. Siloing national 
and international policy for what can be seen as related crimes may prevent us from 
gaining an accurate understanding of the results of our interventions. 
 To use the example of the village of Quila Quila in Bolivia, we can see a potential 
outcome of viewing cultural property theft as separate from internal instability 












































and insecurity. This community, out of a profound sense of insecurity and lack of 
confidence in the authorities, turned to fatal vigilantly justice to punish cultural 
property robbers. Although this is an extreme, it illustrates what might be a lack of 
non-heritage-related development within our cultural property protection regime. 
Perhaps we should make heritage protection a component of more general policy 
towards social improvement, not a stand-alone area in which capacity is built but 
no foundation exists for that capacity to rest on. 
 SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE GROUND 
 What, then can be done to improve international policy related to antiquities 
trafficking? That is not an easy question to answer; however beyond what I have 
previously discussed, this fieldwork in Bolivia and Belize points to two areas of 
potential improvement. 
 First, object-focused import restrictions should be promoted. Banning the import 
of all permit-less Pre-Columbian sculptural pieces, no matter their country of 
origin, nearly eliminated the market for such items in the U.S. This can and should 
be done on a global scale, perhaps using CITES as a model. CITES has its flaws, 
but by banning the free movement of certain animals and plants, no matter their 
country of origin, many of the exploitable aspects of other types of regulation are 
avoided. Mandatory export and import permits will go a long way to eliminating 
traffickers’ ability to “clean” illicit antiquities for the more “respectable” market. 
There will be no “respectable” illicit antiquities and the reduction in demand will 
naturally reduce motivation to loot for supply. 
 Second, we should emphasize policing and punishment of traffickers and buyers 
rather than spend time and money on the return of a limited number of cultural 
objects. If we accept that most people in developing countries who engage in loot-
ing are doing so because of a lack of viable alternatives and as part of any number of 
illicit and licit short-term economic activities, it is clear that focusing policing and 
punishment on them is useless. The more powerful end of the market will find other 
desperate people to commit those crimes. Instead of policy focused on asset return, 
we need policy focused on reducing the market. This means real punishment for 
collectors and museums found to be buying looted goods and this means breaking 
up networks. Any future international regulation should still mandate international 
cooperation, but that cooperation should be policing- and enforcement-focused. 
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